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IN A CONFLICT BETWEEN EQUAL RIGHTS FOR WOMEN AND
CUSTOMARY LAW, THE BOTSWANA COURT OF APPEAL
CHOOSES EQUALITY
Michael P Seng*

N

INETEEN ninety-two was a good year for women's rights. The
United States Supreme Court reaffirmed a woman's right to choose
whether to have an abortion, stating that the right was important to
facilitate "[t]he ability of women to participate equally in the economic
and social life of the Nation."' Bill Clinton was elected President of the
United States on promises to support "free choice" in abortions, to lift
the "gag-rule" on abortion counseling by recipients of federal funds,2 to
support legislation for child care and family leave time from work and
to open the military to gays and lesbians. The new first lady, Hillary
Rodham Clinton, gave the country a new model for a first lady, and the
United States Senate increased its membership of women by three hundred
percent, including the first African-American woman.3 Nineteen ninetytwo signaled that women were finally coming into their own in the United
States and that the4 backlash against women so ably described by Susan
Faludi was ending.
A little noted decision handed down by the Botswana Court of Appeal
in July of 1992 may give even greater satisfaction to the women's rights
movement worldwide than the new turn of events in the United States.
In Attorney General v Unity Dow,' the Court of Appeal declared the
Botswana Citizenship Act of 19846 (the Act) unconstitutional on the
ground that it discriminated against women. The decision is of major
significance not only for Botswana, but for all of Africa, where women
are struggling for recognition of some of the most basic human rights.
The decision holds that customary laws on the status of women must
yield to constitutional provisions protecting equal rights when there is a
conflict.
* Professor, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois.
The author would like to thank Carol Pauli and John Hudelson for their helpful
comments about this article.
I. Planned Parenthood v Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2809 (1992).
2. The "gag-rule" was upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Rust v Sullivan,
11I S. Ct. 1759 (1991).

3. After the 1992 elections, there were six women in the Senate whereas there had
previously been two. The number of women in the House of Representatives was increased

from 29 to 48.
4. SUSAN FALUDI, BACKLASH (1991).
5. Civ App. No. 4/91 (Bots. App. Ct. June 3, 1992).
6. Cap. 01:01/1987 Rev Amending the Citizenship Act of 1982 (Act 25 1982).
Relevant portions of the Citizenship Act of 1984 are reprinted on pages 2-3 of the Unity
Dow opinion.

HeinOnline -- 24 U. Tol. L. Rev. 563 1992-1993

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

In 1984, the Botswana Citizenship Act was enacted to provide that
persons could become citizens of Botswana by birth and descent only if
at the time of birth their fathers were citizens of Botswana or, in the case
of persons born out of wedlock, their mothers were citizens of Botswana.7
Unity Dow, a citizen of Botswana and a lawyer, was married to an
American, Peter Nathan Dow, who had been residing in Botswana for
fourteen years. Their first child was born out of wedlock in 1979 and
accordingly was a citizen of Botswana. The couple were married in 1984
and had two additional children, both of whom were born in Botswana
and lived there continuously since their birth. By terms of the Act, ' these
children born after the marriage were not citizens of Botswana and were
indeed aliens in the land of their birth.
I.

THE LAND

Botswana is located in the heart of southern Africa. It is completely
landlocked. To the south is South Africa, to the west is Namibia, to the
north are Angola and Zambia and to the east is Zimbabwe. The country
is roughly the size of Texas, and the terrain is largely desert and savanna.
The population is just above one and a quarter million persons.
Compared to many modern African nations, ethnic and tribal tensions
in Botswana are minimal.' The majority tribe is the Tswana, followed by
the Kalanga in the northeast. A number of smaller tribes also coexist in
Botswana. Most notable to Westerners because of the large number of
anthropological studies on them are the San, sometimes known as the
Basarwa or Bushmen. Most of the people who reside in Botswana are
cattle herders and farmers.
Probably because of its location and seeming lack of wealth, Botswana
was never colonized by the Europeans to the extent of most other African
countries. Because of disputes in the latter nineteenth century between the
Batswana' ° and the Afrikaners, the British created "Bechuanaland." The
northern part of Bechuanaland, a British protectorate, is now Botswana.
Botswana became independent of the British in 1966.
Botswana remains an exception in post-colonial Africa, where most
nations have, for some period of time, experienced some form of

7 Id. § 4.
8. Id.
9. This does not mean that ethnic and tribal tensions are absent. For instance, the
Kalanga want the right to instruct their children in school in their own language. Today

the official language is English, and the language of use is Setswana. The San, who are
traditionally nomadic hunters and gatherers and who are being pushed off the game
reserves and other public lands, are seeking recognition of their traditional rights and

culture.
10. The country is Botswana. The majority tribe is the Tswana, which has a number
of different sub-tribes. Persons residing in Botswana are singularly referred to as Motswana

and in the plural as Batswana. The language is Setswana.
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authoritarian rule." Regular elections have been held for the National
Assembly and the Presidency The Botswana Democratic Party (BDP) has
traditionally swept all national elections, but there exists a vigorous if not
powerful opposition. Concern is often voiced about the depth of the
commitment to democracy and whether "democracy" will be crushed if
the current majority sees its power begin to slip. Nonetheless, Batswana
appear to be proud of their democratic tradition and are not likely to
lightly forfeit it.
Botswana has a written constitution 12 and bill of rights. 3 Botswana has
an independent judiciary where judges are appointed by the President and
can be removed only for cause. 14 The lowest court is the High Court,
and appeals can be taken to the Court of Appeal of Botswana in Lobatse.
The Constitution specifically provides for judicial redress for those whose
rights are violated. 5
Botswana's democratic tradition is frequently traced back to the "kgotla"
meeting. 6 Under customary law, every Motswana belonged to a specific
ward of varying size. 7 Most governmental operations occurred at the
ward level. Each ward had a headman, who was appointed by the chief
largely on the basis of heredity The headman was required to consult
with the adult males in the ward. This consultation occurred at the kgotla
meeting. The kgotla was held in the early morning at a regularly designated
outside arena in the ward. Specific matters of administration and legislation
were discussed, and everyone present was allowed to voice his opinion.
Decisions were reached by consensus.
The kgotla also operated as a local court. 8 Disputes were placed before
the kgotla, evidence was heard and discussed and a consensus reached.
Appeals could be taken to the Chief's kgotla. The kgotla system furthered
individual participation and responsibility and militated against dictatorial

11. See John Holm, Botswana: A Paternalistic Democracy, in 4 DEMOCRACY IN
179 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1988).
12. BOTSWANA CONST. (amended 1987).
13. Id. ch. II.
14. The President appoints the Chief Justice of the High Court, id. ch. VI, § 96(1),
and the President of the Court of Appeal. Id. ch. VI, § 100(i). Judges are appointed to
the High Court on the advice of the Judicial Service Commission, id. ch. VI, § 96(2), as
are the Justices of the Court of Appeal. Id. ch. V1, § 100(2). The Constitution provides
for the independence of the Judicial Service Commission. Id. ch. V1, § 103.
Judges on the High Court and Court of Appeal must retire, unless an exception is
made, at the age of 65, or they can be removed either for nonperformance of their duties
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: AFRICA

or for misbehavior. Id. ch. VI, §§ 97

101.

15. The Constitution provides that if any person alleges that any of the provisions of
the Bill of Rights "has been, is being or is likely to be contravened in relation to him,

then, without prejudice to any other action with respect to the same matter which is
lawfully available, that person may apply to the High Court for redress." Id. ch. II, §
18.
16. See L.D. Ngcongco, Botswana's Historical Experience with Democracy in DEMOCRACY IN BOTSWANA 42-47 (Holm & Molutsi eds., 1989).
17 See I. SCHAPERA & JOHN L. COMOROFF, THE TSWANA

39-41 (rev ed. 1991).

18. See id. at 49-51.

HeinOnline -- 24 U. Tol. L. Rev. 565 1992-1993

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

rule. The focus was on harmony and consensus and the good of the
community
At the time of independence in 1966, Botswana was one of Africa's
poorest and least developed areas. The people lived and worked much as
they had done for centuries. However, diamonds were discovered in
Botswana the year after independence and today Botswana has one of
the highest per capita income reserves in Africa. Unlike other African
nations, Botswana did not go on a spending binge. The infra-structure
and educational resources have been developed but not at the expense of
conspicuous consumption. Nonetheless, tensions are beginning to show 19
Traditional life is being disrupted. Batswana are moving to the cities, and
family breakups, illegitimacy and crime are starting to edge upward.
Compared to the rest of the continent, Botswana's problems appear to
be solvable so long as the will remains to do that.
II.

THE STATUS OF WOMEN UNDER TSWANA CUSTOMARY LAW

The Batswana had a highly developed customary law that covered the
marriage relationship and the status of women. Traditionally, marriage
was a matter of general community concern and was considered a union
of families more than a union between two individuals.20 In practice, the
21
offspring of the marriage were often shared between the families.
Polygamy was widely practiced in traditional society, but the practice is
dying out today

22

Formerly, women were considered to be socially inferior to men and
were treated as minors throughout their lives. Before marriage, a woman
was under the guardianship of her father; after marriage, she was under
the guardianship of her husband; after her husband's death, she was
under the guardianship of her son or other male relative. 3 Women had
little, if any, part in governmental activities. In public social activities,
they generally formed separate groupings, and they had their own separate
work and domestic responsibilities.
Today, some women leave home and accumulate assets of their own
and participate in commercial transactions without the consent of a
guardian. 4 Women also vote and participate in political activities, although
few women hold important positions in either the public or the private

19. See Joseph Contreras, An African Success Story

NEWSWEEK, Oct. 28, 1991, at

20.
20. B.C. Thema, The Changing Pattern of Tswana Social and Family Relations, in 4
BOTSWANA NOTES & RECORDS 39, 40 (1972).
21. Id. at 41.
22. I. SCHAPERA, MARRIED LIFE IN AN AFRICAN TRIBE 336 (1941).
23. Id.
24. See Simon Roberts, Tswana Family Law, in 5 RESTATEMENT OF AFRICAN LAW
(BOTSWANA 1) 20 (1972).
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sectors. 25 Neither the customary law nor the common 6 or statutory law
has kept pace so as to fully
define the rights and responsibilities of women
27
in this new environment.

Traditionally among the Tswana, marriage was not accomplished through
a single ceremony It started with a mutual agreement (a betrothal) between
the two families and was completed by the transfer of bogadi, generally
in the form of cattle, from the bridegroom to the bride's family 21 The
couple generally lived together and had children after the betrothal. The
transfer of bogadi may not have occurred for some time thereafter
The Tswana distinguished between physiological paternity and legal
paternity 29 Legal paternity did not occur until the transfer of bogadi.
Until bogadi was transferred, a woman's reproductive power belonged to
her own family, and children were considered part of her father's house.
Upon the payment of bogadi, the husband was fully entitled to the
children he had begotten so that they became part of his house. Because
the husband owned the reproductive rights of his wife, he could also
claim any children begat through her adulterous activities.3 0 Today,
customary law has evolved so that children born to a married woman are
members of her husband's
descent group regardless of whether bogadi
3
has been transferred.

1

Traditionally, unmarried girls who became pregnant were scorned, and
their children either were killed at birth or suffered from severe social

stigma.3 2 Today, this is not the case. 33 The child is considered part of the

mother's family The father takes the child if he marries the mother or
adopts the child. If the father does not exercise either of these options,
a man who subsequently marries the woman may claim the child, although
the child may enjoy a status inferior to the husband's own children.
Under customary law, women were clearly not equal to men. In this,
Tswana society differed little from most traditional societies, including
traditional Western societies. Today in Botswana, couples who marry may
choose to be bound either by customary law or by common or statutory
law However, the common or statutory law is little better than customary
law when it comes to women's rights. Under the Roman-Dutch common
law applied in Botswana, the husband is designated head of the family,
25. Motsei Madisa, Women and Politics, in MULTI-PARTY DEMOCRACY IN BOTSWANA
55-59 (Mpho G. Molomo & Brian T Mokopakgosi eds., 1991).
26. "Common law" in Botswana is generally the Roman-Dutch law borrowed from
South Africa.

27 Athaliah Molokomme, Women's Law in Botswana: Laws and Research Needs, in
THE LEGAL SITUATION OF WOMEN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 13 (Julie Steward & Alice Armstrong
eds., 1990); Roberts, supra note 24, at 18 ff.
28. The marriage ceremony is described in I. SCHAPERA, A HANDBOOK OF TSWANA
LAW AND CUSTOM 125 (1970).

29. Id. at 169.
30. Id. at 170-71.
31. Roberts, supra note 24, at 22.
32. SCHAPERA, supra note 28, at 171-73.
33. Roberts, supra note 24, at 22.
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chooses the matrimonial domicile, has guardianship of the children and
exercises control over the couple's joint property unless specifically excluded
from doing so by contract before the marriage.14 Modern statutes have
done little to correct this situation.3
III.

THE UNITY Dow CASE

Unity Dow filed her action in the High Court to declare Section 4 of
the Citizenship Act in violation of the fundamental rights and freedoms
protected by Chapter II of the Botswana Constitution. The High Court
ruled in her favor, finding that the Act discriminated against women. 36
The High Court judge stated:
I therefore find that Section 4 [of the Citizenship Act] is discriminatory in
its effect on women in that, as a matter of policy,
It may compel them to live and bear children, outside wedlock.
(i)
(ii) Since her children are only entitled to remain in Botswana if they are
in possession of a residence permit and since they are not granted
permits in their own right, their right to remain in Botswana is
dependent upon their forming part of their father's residence permit.
(iii) The residence permits are granted for no more than two years at a
time, and if the applicant's husband's permit were not renewed both
he and applicant's minor children would be obligated to leave Botswana.
(iv) In addition applicant is jointly responsible with her husband for the
education of their children. Citizens of Botswana qualify for financial
assistance in the form of bursaries to meet the costs of university
education. This is a benefit which is not available to a non-citizen. In
the result the applicant is financially prejudiced by the fact that her
children are not Botswana citizens.
(v)
Since the children would be obliged to travel on their father's passport
the applicant will not be entitled to return to Botswana with her
children in the absence of their father.
What I have set out at length may inhibit women in Botswana from marrying
the man whom they love. It is no answer to say that there are laws against
marrying close blood relations-that is a reasonable exclusion
It seems to me that the effect of section 4 is to pumsh a citizen female for
marrying a non-citizen male. For this she is put in the unfavourable position
in which she finds herself viz-a-viz her children and her country
The fact that according to the Citizenship Act a child born to a marriage
between a citizen female and a non-citizen male follows the citizenship of
its father may not in fact have that result.

34. Athaliah Molokomme, Marriage-What Every Woman Wants or "Civil Death"?

in WOMAN AND LAW IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 182-85 (Alice Armstrong & Welshman Ncude
eds., 1987). See also John Kiggundu, The Law of Domicile in Botswana: The Need for
Reform, 2 AiR. J. INT'L & Comp LAW 626 (1990).
35. Molokomme, supra note 34, at 185.
36. The High Court decision is analyzed in E.K. Quansah, Unity Dow v Attorney
General of Botswana-One More Relic of a Woman's Servitude Removed, 4 AFR. J.
INT'L & Con' LAW 195 (1992).
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It depends on the law of the foreign country. The result may be that the
child may be rendered stateless unless its parents emigrate. If they are forced
to emigrate then the unfortunate
consequences which I have set out earlier
7

in this judgment may ensure.

The Attorney General appealed to the Court of Appeal on the grounds
that the High Court erred in holding that the Act was unconstitutional
and that, in any event, the complainant lacked standing to make the
argument.
A.

The Botswana Citizenship Act of 1984

The modern nation-state, with its attendant concepts of citizenship, did
not exist in traditional Tswana society The basic unit in society was the
family Family ties were close. Family members helped each other in times
of trouble, and family relationships were governed by well-defined
principles.3

Tribal membership was quite fluid.3 9 While tribal membership was
primarily determined by descent through the father, persons could become
members of a tribe through conquest or by pledging allegiance to the
Chief. Tribal membership was thus not permanently fixed by birth.
In traditional Tswana society, even apart from issues of gender, not all
persons were equalA° Nobles were those related to the Chief. Commoners
were non-royal members of the nuclear group who participated fully in
the life of the tribe. Immigrants or foreigners were aliens who had not
become fully assimilated. They could participate in community activities,
although as a practical matter their word might not count for as much
as that of a noble or commoner. Some Tswana had serfs. The serfs were
often members of minority tribes like the Bushman, and they had few
civil rights. Upward mobility between the classes appears to have been
fluid. Today, most class distinctions and inequalities have, at least in
theory, ceased to exist.
The British created the Bechuanaland Protectorate in 1885. Presumably,
persons who were in the area of the Protectorate acquired citizenship
under British law, 4 but the real concern about who was a citizen of
Botswana did not arise until the creation of Botswana as an independent
nation-state in 1966.
Chapter III of the 1966 Constitution defined citizenship. Section 21
declared, with certain exceptions, that a person born in Botswana after

37 Attorney General v Unity Dow Civ App. No. 4/91, at 5 (Bots. App. Ct. June
3, 1992) (opinion of Amissah, J.P.).
38. See SCHAPERA & COMOROFF, supra note 17 at 38-39.
39. See id. at 28-29; SCHAPERA, supra note 28, at 118-21.
40. SCHAPERA, supra note 28, at 30-31. See also K. Datta & A. Murray, The Rights
of Minorities and Subject Peoples in Botswana: A Historical Evaluation, in DEMOCRACY
iN BOTSWANA 58-68 (John Holm & Patrick Molutsi eds., 1989).
41. Unity Dow Civ App. No. 4/91 at 26 (opinion of Amissah, J. P.).
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September 30, 1966 would become a citizen of Botswana. 42 Section 22
distinguished children born outside of Botswana. They became citizens
only if their fathers were citizens of Botswana. 43
The present Citizenship Act came into effect in 1984 and repealed
Chapter III of the Constitution. It provided in pertinent part:
4. (1) A person born in Botswana shall be a citizen of Botswana by birth
and descent if, at the time of his birth,
(a) his father was a citizen of Botswana; or
(b) in the case of a person born out of wedlock, his mother was a
citizen of Botswana.
(2) A person born before the commencement of this Act shall not be
a citizen by virtue of this section unless he was a citizen at the time of such
commencement.
5. (1) A person born outside Botswana shall be a citizen of Botswana by
descent if, at the time of his birth,
(a) his father was a citizen of Botswana; or
(b) in the case of a person born out of wedlock, his mother was a
citizen of Botswana.
(2) A person born before the commencement of this Act shall not be
a citizen by virtue of this section unless he was a citizen at the time of such
commencement."
The purpose of the 1984 Act was to bring citizenship into accord with
customary law After the Act came into force, members of the Law
Reform Committee went about the country getting the reaction of the
people to it. 45 The evidence indicated that the majority of Batswana
supported the Act and that only a small group of urban women married
to foreigners opposed it. 46
In his opinion holding the Citizenship Act unconstitutional, Judge
President Amissah of the Court of Appeal refused to give the Law
Commission Report any weight. 47 The Report was assembled after the
Act was passed. Furthermore, what the Court was trying to do, he noted,
was unravel the meaning of the Constitution and not the meaning of the
Citizenship Act. The Judge President suggested that had the Law
Commission canvassed the people of Botswana prior to the adoption of
the Constitution to determine whether they felt the overriding characteristics
of their society should not be altered by any individual rights or freedoms
conferred by the Constitution, the report might have been of assistance
in construing ambiguities in the Constitution." However, no ambiguities

42. BOTSWANA CONST. ch. III, § 21. See Quansah, supra note 36, at 197
43. Unity Dow Civ App. No. 4/91, at 47 (opinion of Amissah, J.P.).

44. Citizenship Act of 1984, Cap. 01:01/1987 Rev., §§ 4-5.
45. REPORT OF THE LAW REFORM COMITTEE ON (i) MARRIAGE
INHERITANCE (nI)

ELECTORAL LAW AND (Iv) CITIZENSHIP LAW

ACT (II) LAW OF

(1989).

46. Quansah, supra note 36, at 201-02.
47 Attorney General v Unity Dow Civ App. No. 4/91, at 24-26 (Bots. App. Ct.
June 3, 1992) (opinion of Amissah, J.P.).
48. Id. at 25-26.
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existed in the Citizenship Act requiring resort to a report compiled after
the fact.
In argument before the Court of Appeal, the Attorney General agreed
that the Citizenship Act discriminated against women, but he argued that
the Act was intentionally discriminatory to preserve the traditional male
orientation of Tswana society 9In his dissenting statement, Justice Schreiner
commented that when Botswana adopted its Constitution it was assumed
that "the social mores of the various groups of inhabitants were presumably
intended to continue unaffected by independence save to the extent that
changes were specifically provided for in the Constitution." 0
However, the Judge President did not see any reason why citizenship
in Botswana must necessarily follow the customary or traditional systems
of the people." He looked at the situation in Botswana before independence,
when under the British law all persons born under the protection of the
sovereign became citizens by birth. It was not claimed, he noted, that this
situation interfered with the male orientation of Botswana customary
society during that period. 2
The Judge President also quoted the distinction made by Oppenheim
between "nationality" in the sense of citizenship in a state and "nationality"
in the sense of belonging to a particular racial or ethnic grouping.53 The
state could define the former without resort to customary ideas about the
latter
The Judge President held that in the final analysis custom must yield
to the preeminence of the Constitution: "A constitutional guarantee cannot
be overridden by custom. Of course, the custom will as far as possible
be read so as to conform with the Constitution. But where this is
impossible, it is custom not the Constitution which must go."5 "
In a concurring opinion, Judge Bizos acknowledged that "the customs,
traditions and culture of a society must be borne in mind and afforded
due respect," but they cannot prevail when they conflict with the express
provisions of the Constitution. "In relation to the protection of personal
and political rights the primary instrument to determine the heartbeat of
Botswana is its Constitution." 5 5
The Attorney General further tried to justify the law on the ground
that it eliminated problems of dual citizenship; however, the Judge President
held that eliminating dual citizenship does not necessarily require legislation
which discriminates between the sexes of the parents.5 6 Therefore, if gender
equality is illegal under the Botswana Constitution, resort to arguments

49. Id.at
50. Id. at
51. Id. at
52. Id. at
53.

54.
55.
56.

21.
108 (opinion of Schreiner, J.).
26 (opinion of Amissah, J.P.),
27-28.
Id. at 28 (quoting I L. OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW 645 (8th ed. 1955).
Id. at 24. See also Ephrahim v. Pastory Civ App. No. 70 (Tanz. High Ct. 1989).
Unity Dow Civ App. No. 4/91, at 105 (opinion of Bizos, J.).
Id. at 30 (opinion of Amissah, J.P.).
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about customary law and about the problems of dual citizenship will not
carry the day
B.

Section 3 of the Botswana Constitution

The provisions in the Constitution that Unity Dow claimed gave her
rights contravened by the Citizenship Act were Sections 3 and 14.
Section 3 of the Botswana Constitution provides:
Whereas every person in Botswana is entitled to the fundamental rights and
freedoms of the individual, that is to say, the right, whatever his race, place
of origin, political opimons, colour, creed or sex, but subject to respect for
the rights and freedoms of others and for the public interest to each and all
the following, namely(a) life, liberty, security of the person and the protection of the law;
(b) freedom of conscience, of expression and of assembly and association;
and
(c) protection for the privacy of his home and other property and from
deprivation of property without compensation,
the provisions of this Chapter shall have effect for the purpose of affording
protection to those rights and freedoms subject to such limitations of that
protection as are contained in those provisions, being limitations designed
to ensure that the enjoyment of the said rights and freedoms by any individual
57
does not prejudice the rights and freedoms of others or the public interest.
Section 14 deals with protection of the freedom of movement, defined
as "the right to move freely throughout Botswana, the right to reside in
any part of Botswana, the right to enter Botswana and immunity from
expulsion from Botswana.""5
The Attorney General argued that Section 3 is simply a preamble to
Chapter I, which defines the fundamental rights and freedoms of the
individual and that Section 3 did not alone confer any rights. He further
argued that Section 15, which provides protection against discrimination,
defines discrimination only on the bases of "race, tribe, place of origin,
political opinions, colour or creed." 5 9
Judge President Amissah began his opinion with a discussion about the
nature of a constitution and constitutional interpretation:
The object [the constitution] is designed to achieve evolves with the evolving
development and aspirations of its people. In terms of the Interpretation
Act,[ 60] the remedial objective is to chart a future for the people, a liberal

57

BOTSWANA CONST. ch. II,

§

3.

58. Id. ch. 1I, § 14(l).
59. Id. ch. i1, § 15(3).

60. The Interpretation Act of 1984, Cap. 01.01, § 26 provides: "Every enactment shall
be deemed remedial and for the public good and shall receive such fair and liberal
construction as will best attain its object according to its true intent and spirit."
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interpretation of that objective brings into focus considerations which
cannot
6
apply to ordinary legislation designed to fit a specific situation. '
The Judge President examined precedents from Botswana and foreign
jurisdictions on constitutional interpretation and concluded:
The lessons they teach are that the very nature of a constitution requires
that a broad and generous approach be adopted in the interpretation of its
provisions; that all the relevant provisions bearing on the subject for interpretation be considered together as a whole in order to effect that objective
of the constitution; and that where rights and freedoms are conferred on
persons by the constitution, derogations62 from such rights and freedoms
should be narrowly or strictly construed.
By opening the pandora's box of constitutional interpretation, the Judge
President started a debate that should be familiar to those concerned with
current constitutional theory in the United States. In his dissenting opinion,
Judge Schreiner cautioned that general dicta indicating that the courts
should interpret provisions protecting human rights liberally does not
justify a departure
from the "plain" meaning of the words used in the
6
Constitution.
Judge Puckrin, another dissenter, suggested that there were three schools
of constitutional interpretation: the "Framer's Intent" school, the "Living
Tree" metaphor and purposive interpretation. 64 He rejected the "Framer's
Intent" school on the ground that a constitution must be interpreted in
light of contemporary experience, not by what was said in the past. 65 He
rejected the "Living Tree" metaphor, which holds that a constitution is
capable of growth and expansion through constitutional interpretation,
because growth must be derived from the democratic process and not
from judicial conviction .16 Purposive interpretation involves the
interpretation of rights "in accordance with the general purpose of having
rights, namely the protection of individuals and minorities against an
overbearing majority "67 Judge Puckrin suggested that the latter approach
combined with a contextual approach is the preferred method to determine
the ambit and extent of any freedom or right under debate.
Judge President Amissah rejected the argument that Section 3 was
nothing more than a preamble. 6 He based his conclusion on the wording
and structure of Section 3 "[Section 3] is the key or umbrella provision

61. Attorney General v Unity Dow Civ App. No. 4/91, at 10 (Bots. App. Ct. June
3, 1992) (opinion of Amissah, J.P.).
62. Id. at 12-13.
63. Id. at IIl (opinion of Schreiner, J.).
64. Id. at 135-40 (opinion of Puckrin, J.).
65. Id.at 136.
66. Id. at 138.
67 Id.at 139-40.
68. Id.at 14 (opinion of Amissah, J.P.).
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in Chapter II under which all rights and freedoms protected under the
Chapter must be subsumed." 6 9
The Judge President rejected the argument that only Section 15 prohibits
discrimination. Rather Sections 4 to 19 expand or limit Section 3, but
"[Slection 3 itself encapsulates the sum total of the individual's rights
and freedoms under the Constitution in general terms." ' 70 Thus, Section
3 requires equal treatment for all, including women, except where limited
by other sections in Chapter II.
The Judge President then considered whether the silence in Section 15
on sex discrimination should be construed as allowing discrimination on
the ground of sex. The Attorney General argued that the word "sex"
was intentionally omitted from Section 15(3) "to accommodate the
patrilineal structure of Botswana society, in terms of the common law,
the customary law, and statute law -71
The Judge President noted that the definition in Section 15(3) is
expressly stated to be applicable to that section alone and, therefore, can
have no application to the equal protection principles articulated in Section
3. 72 He noted that the provisions in Chapter II stating an exception or
limitation to a right or freedom do so expressly, in clear language. 73 There
is no language in Chapter II that excepts discrimination on the basis of
sex from the rights conferred in Section 3 74 The Judge President concluded
that the framers of the Constitution did not intend to declare that all
vulnerable groups or classes were identified and mentioned for all time
in the Section 15(3) definition. Rather, the groups are mentioned by way
of example. 75 He suggested that discrimination against the disabled,
discrimination based on language or geographical division or discrimination
on the basis of religion or community may be prohibited, although these
classifications are not mentioned in Section 15(3).76
To exclude gender discrimination from constitutional proscription would
allow the legislature to exclude women from voting or holding political
office. 77 The Judge President remarked that a decision by the Court of
Appeal upholding gender discrimination under the Botswana Constitution
would be as outrageous today as the decision of the United States Supreme
Court upholding racial discrimination under the U.S. Constitution in Dred
Scott v Sanford78 was in 1857 19

69. Id.at 15.
70. Id. at 17
71. Attorney General v Unity Dow Civ App. No. 4/91, at 32 (Bots. App. Ct. June
3, 1992) (opinion of Amissah, J.P.).
72. Id.at 33.
73. Id.at 34.
74. Id. at 36.

75. Id.at 40.
76. Id.at 41.
77 Id.
78. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
79. Unty Dow, Civ App. No. 4/91 at 44 (opinion of Armssah, J.P.).
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The Attorney General's argument that a law relating to citizenship was
a "personal law" and therefore fell under Section 15(4) of the Constitution
which excluded laws "with respect to adoption, marriage, divorce, burial,
devolution of property on death or other matters of personal law" from
the anti-discrimination provisions was likewise rejected. 0 The Judge
President first commented that Section 15 did not deal with sex but only
with discrimination on the basis of "race, tribe, place of origin, political
opinions, colour or creed."'" Second, the Judge narrowly defined personal
law as "the system of law that applies to a person and his transactions
determined by his tribe, religious group, case, or other personal factors,
as distinct from the territorial law of the country to which he belongs,
in
8' 2
which he finds himself, or in which the transaction takes place."
The fact that former Chapter III of the Constitution had provisions
that defined a child's citizenship based on the citizenship of the father 3
was also deemed to be irrelevant. 4 The Citizenship Act, merely a statute,
must be consistent with the Constitution which can always place limitations
on its exemptions. Therefore, the limited exemption in the Constitution
did not grant a general license to discriminate on the basis of gender
Based on these reasons, the Court of Appeal held that Section 3 outlawed
gender discrimination, at least when the treatment of the different sexes
cannot be based on biological differences."5
C. InternationalLaw
The Court of Appeal found support for its opinion that the Botswana
Constitution prohibited gender discrimination in international law By
looking to the standards of international law, the Court showed a catholicity
that has not always characterized the decisions of the U.S. Supreme
Court."
Judge President Amissah referred to Section 24 of the Botswana
Interpretation Act,8 7 which allows the courts to construe an enactment by

reference to any relevant international treaty, agreement or convention.88
He also referred to Article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human

80. Id. at 45.
81. Attorney General v Unity Dow Civ App. No. 4/91, at 45 (Bots. App. Ct. June
3, 1992) (opinion of Amissah, J.P.).
82. Id. at 46.
83. See supra text accompanying note 43.
84. Unity Dow, Civ App. No. 4/91, at 47-48 (opinion of Amissah, J.P.).
85. Id. at 43.
86. See United States v Alvarez-Macham, 112 S. Ct. 2188 (1992) (upholding the
jurisdiction of United States courts to try a Mexican national who was kidnapped and
brought to the United States by United States agents); Stanford v Kentucky 492 U.S.
361, 369 n.1 (1989) (upholding the imposition of capital punishment for crimes committed
by juveniles, despite contrary international standards). See also Louis Henkin, A Descent
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, 25 J. MARSHALL L. REV 215 (1992).
87 Interpretation Act of 1984, Cap. 01.01, § 2.
88. Unity Dow, Civ App. No. 4/91 at 49 (opinion of Amissah, J.P.).

HeinOnline -- 24 U. Tol. L. Rev. 575 1992-1993

UNIVERSITY OF TOLEDO LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 24

Rights, 9 which provides that all persons enjoy the right to be free from
distinctions based on sex, and concluded:
The British Government must have subscribed to this Declaration on behalf
of itself and all dependent territories, including Bechuanaland, long before
Botswana became a State. And it must have formed part of the backdrop
of aspirations and desires against which the framers of the Constitution of
Botswana formulated its provisions.9
Botswana is a signatory of the African Charter on Human and People's
Rights, 91 which prohibits sex discrimination. The Attorney General argued
that although Botswana had ratified the African Charter, it had not
incorporated it into domestic law 92 The Judge President acknowledged
that the African Charter was not binding inside Botswana as legislation,
but stated that it could clearly be referred to as a source for interpreting
difficult provisions of the Botswana Constitution. 93 He concluded:
I am in agreement that Botswana is a member of the community of civilised
States which has undertaken to abide by certain standards of conduct, and,
unless it is impossible to do otherwise, it would be wrong for its Courts to
interpret its legislation in a manner which conflicts with the international
obligations Botswana has undertaken. This principle, used as an aid to
construction as is quite permissible under Section 24 of the Interpretation
Act, adds reinforcement to the view that the intention of the framers of the
Constitution could not have been to permit discrimination purely on the
94
basis of sex.

89. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III), U.N. Doc. A/810
(1948). Article 2 reads: "Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in

this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour sex, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property birth or other
status."
90. Unity Dow, Civ App. No. 4/91 at 52 (opinion of Amissah, J.P.).
91. The African Charter was adopted on June 17 1981 by the Eighteenth Assembly
of the Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity Article 2
of the Charter provides: "Every individual shall be entitled to the enjoyment of the rights
and freedoms recognized and guaranteed in the present Charter without distinction of any
kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion, political or any other
opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or other status." African Charter on
Human and Peoples' Rights art. 2, reprinted in BAsic DOCUMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS
551, 553 (lan Brownlie ed., 1992). Paragraphs I and 2 of Article 12 state:
1. Every individual shall have the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of a State provided he abides by the law.
2. Every individual shall have the right to leave any country including his own, and
return to his country This right may only be subject to restriction, provided for
by law for the protection of national security, law and order, public health and
morality
1-2, supra, at 554.
Id. art. 12,
92. Attorney General v Unity Dow Civ App. No. 4/91 (Bots. App. Ct. June 3,
1992) (opinion of Amissah, J.P.).
93. Id. at 53.
94. Id.at 54.
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In his separate opinion concurring with Judge President Amissah, Judge
Bizos similarly concluded that the Botswana Constitution was enacted
with reference to modern international standards prohibiting gender
discrimination. 95 However, Judge Schreiner disagreed. He stated that
Section 15(9) preserves laws that were in force before the Constitution
was enacted and continue to be in force after its enactment from the antidiscrimination provisions of Section 15 He also relied on former Chapter
III of the Botswana Constitution, which provided that under certain
circumstances children took the citizenship of their father and not their
mother He argued that these provisions evidenced that the drafters of
the Botswana Constitution had no intention to outlaw discrimination on
the ground of sex so as to comply with international standards, and he
concluded that change, if it is to come, will have to come through
legislative action. 96
However, by looking to international standards, the majority of the
judges on the Court of Appeal gave the decision in Unity Dow a firm
grounding. The decision provides a useful precedent for Botswana and
for the other African nations that have ratified the African Charter on
Human and People's Rights.
D. Standing
The final argument raised by the Attorney General was that the
complainant had no standing to bring this action. He argued that she was
not sufficiently affected by any action that might be taken against her
children, that as a practicing lawyer she freely chose to marry into the
existing citizenship regime and that there was no immediate threat that
her husband would be expelled from Botswana thereby disrupting the
lives of her children.Y
The Judge President countered that a person should not be prejudiced
in his or her rights because that person is a lawyer 98 In response to the
Attorney General's argument that the doctrine of popularisactio of Roman
law, which gives individuals the right to assert matters of public interest,
is not a part of Roman-Dutch common law, the Judge President cited
the holding of a South African Appellate Court that once an individual's
personal rights are affected, the individual can also "protect the rights of
the public." 99
The Judge President also relied on Section 18(1) of the Botswana
Constitution, which allows any person who alleges a violation of the
Constitution to apply to a court for redress. He stated that this provision
gives broad standing rights and should not be whittled down by principles

95. Id. at 100-01 (opinion of Bizos, J.).

96.
97
98.
99

Id. at 128 (opinion of Schreiner, J.).
Id. at 54-55 (opinion of Amissah, J.P.).
Id. at 55.
Id. at 56 (citing Wood v Odanquva Tribal Auth. [1975(2)1 A.D. 294, at 310).
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derived from the common law, whether Roman-Dutch, English or
Botswana.10
The Judge President further rejected the argument that the Citizenship
Act affected only the children, not their mother By placing restrictions
on the children, the mother's freedom was also circumscribed.' 0 '
Furthermore, the Judge President rejected the argument that because
under Botswana customary law the father is the guardian of the children,
only he can represent the children's interests. He held that a parent has
responsibilities to a child distinct from those of a guardian that give the
02
parent standing to sue on behalf of the child.
Neither of the dissenting judges disputed the Judge President's finding
that the complainant had standing to bring the action. The decision
therefore stands as a powerful precedent to uphold broad standing for
persons who seek to challenge unconstitutional governmental actions in
03
Botswana in the future.
IV

IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION

The Court of Appeal left the citizens of Botswana with two basic
choices: amend the Citizenship Act of 1984 to comply with the Constitution,

100. Id. at 57

101. Id. at 59
102. Attorney General v Unity Dow, Civ App. No. 4/91, at 59-60 (Bots. App. Ct.
June 3, 1992) (opinion of Amissah, J.P.).
103. Judge Aguda, in his separate concurring opinion, relied on §§ 42 and 44 of the
Constitutions of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1979 and 1989 respectively Unity Dow,
Civ App. No. 4/91, at 92-93 (opinion of Agula, J.). These sections of the Nigerian
Constitution, like § 18(1) of the Botswana Constitution, allow any injured person to bring
an action for redress of his or her constitutional rights. In Adesanya v President of the
Republic, 2 Nig. Con. L. Rep. 358 (Nig. Sup. Ct. 1981), Chief Justice Fatayl-Williams
construed § 41 to hold that a senator lacked standing as an injured person to challenge
the appointment and subsequent confirmation of the Chairman of the Federal Election
Commission. Despite this holding, the Chief Justice made the following observation:
[I] take significant cognisance of the fact that Nigeria is a developing country with a
multi-ethnic society and a written Federal Constitution, where rumour-mongering is
the pastime of the market places and the construction sites. To deny any member of
such a society who is aware or believes, or is led to believe, that there has been an
infraction of any of the provisions of our Constitution, or that any law passed by
any of our Legislative Houses, whether Federal or State, is unconstitutional, access
to a Court of Law to air his grievance on the flimsy excuse of lack of sufficient
interest is to provide a ready recipe for organized disenchantment with the judicial
process.
In the Nigerian context, it is better to allow a party to go to court and to be heard
than to refuse him access to our courts. Non-access, to my mind, will stimulate the
free-for-all in the media as to which law is constitutional and which law is not! In
any case, our courts have inherent powers to deal with vexatious litigants or frivolous
claims. To re-echo the words of Learned Hand, if we are to keep our democracy
there must be one commandment-thou shall not ration justice.
Id. at 373.

HeinOnline -- 24 U. Tol. L. Rev. 578 1992-1993

Spring 19931

WOMEN'S RIGHTS IN BOTSWANA

or amend the Constitution to permit gender discrimination. The latter°4
approach, while it might be politically popular among traditionalists,'
would clearly retard future progress toward the implementation of the
human rights standards now contained in Chapter II of the Botswana
Constitution and in the African Charter on Human and People's Rights
and other international documents. The liberal interpretation given to
Section 3 of the Botswana Constitution by the Court of Appeal, if allowed
to stand, opens the door for the further recognition of human rights in
Botswana.
Judge Aguda, in his concurring opinion, specifically disclaimed any
inference that the Court was deciding any issue other than the validity of
the Citizenship Act. 05 The Attorney General had argued that if the
Citizenship Act was declared unconstitutional, the courts would also have
to declare unconstitutional the Administration of Estates Act,1°6 which
07
allows women to administer an estate only with her husband's consent,
the Deeds Registry Act,'0 which prevents immovable property from being
°9
registered in the name of a woman married in community of property,1
i0
of
a
director
become
a
to
the Companies Act, " which allows a woman
company only if her husband gives his consent, and a host of other
laws."'

104. A newspaper article reported that few Botswana citizens favored amending the
Citizenship Act to give equal rights to women and that many knowledgeable observers
believed the Unity Dow decision would never be enforced. Nonetheless, the article reported
that a women's rights group was preparing a campaign to force the legislature to amend
the Citizenship Act and to reform the many other laws that discriminate against women.
Bobbie Jo Kelso, A Woman's Place Is At the Center of the Storm, DAILY MAMi, Aug.
14-20, 1992, at 12.
Of course, a third option also exists; that is for the legislature to do nothing, thereby
leaving the decision unimplemented. If that were to happen, the decision might still have
an important educative function and would inform Batswana that when they discriminate
on the basis of gender they are going against the spirit and letter of their constitution. It
would be hoped that eventually political leaders and the populace would accept the
principle that discrimination against women is not only technically illegal but is wrong.
105. Unity Dow, Civ App. No. 4/91, at 88 (opinion of Aguda, J.).
106. Cap. 31.01, § 28(5).
107 The United States Supreme Court declared unconstitutional an Idaho law requiring
that males be preferred to females in the choice of persons to administer intestate estates.
Reed v Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
108. Cap. 33.02, § 18(4).
109. The United States Supreme Court held unconstitutional a Louisiana law that gave
a husband exclusive control of jointly held property. Kirchberg v Feenstra, 450 U.S. 455
(1981). Similarly, in Ephrahim v. Pastory, Civ App. No. 70 (Tanz. High Ct. 1989), the
High Court of Tanzania relied in part on the African Charter, which had been ratified
by the Tanzanian legislature, to hold that a woman could inherit land. It was argued that
under customary law a woman's right over property was limited, but the court held that
the Tanzanian Bill of Rights took precedence over customary law This case is discussed
in Rebecca J. Cook, InternationalHuman Rights Law Concerning Women: Case Notes

and Comments, 23

VAND.

J.

TRANSNAT'L

L. 779, 815 (1990).

110. Cap. 42:01.
111. Unity Dow, Civ App. No. 4/91, at 88 (opinion of Aguda, J.).
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Judge Aguda denied that the unconstitutionality of these laws was a
foregone conclusion. He gave some examples in which difference of sex
may justify difference of treatment. For instance, the penal code provisions
prohibit the execution of a pregnant woman, and the Employment Act2
provisions allow a pregnant woman maternity leave from her employment.,
Nonetheless, these examples are restricted to situations resulting from
actual, and not just perceived, biological differences between men and
women. The statutes cited by the Attorney General are not of this kind,
and they will obviously be very difficult for the courts to sustain in light
of the Unity Dow holding.
Women throughout southern Africa have been advocating an end to
unequal treatment. The Women and Law in Southern Africa Research
Project has been doing comparative research in Botswana, Lesotho,
Mozambique, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The project has already
generated two books"' and a number of reports, particularly on
maintenance law
At about the same time the Unity Dow decision was handed down, the
Swaziland research team of the Women and Law Project issued a report
on maintenance in that country 14 The Swazi report showed that
maintenance problems were widespread in that country; thirty-eight percent
of the women surveyed had a maintenance problem, but only thirty-six
percent of these women had done anything about it. Women were reluctant
to use the legal system to force maintenance for a number of reasons,
including fear and a general sense of powerlessness. When women did go
to court, they generally received inadequate awards and had difficulty
enforcing them.'" The Unity Dow decision may not directly have a solution
for all of these problems; but, to the extent that the Botswana Court of
Appeal recognized equal rights for women, the decision may prompt an
increased awareness of the problems faced by women, thereby inspiring
a search for solutions to those problems not only in Botswana but
throughout Africa.
One could argue that the Court of Appeal was overly influenced by
evolving international standards on sexual equality and that it should have
been more sensitive to Tswana customary law Thus, the Court should
have left the Botswana legislature free to evolve its own solution on how6
to accommodate human rights norms to traditional standards."

112. Attorney General v Unity Dow Civ App. No. 4191, at 88-89 (Bots. App. Ct.
June 3, 1992) (opinion of Agunda, J.).
113. WOMEN AND LAW IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 34; THE LEGAL SITUATION OF
WOMEN IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, supra note 27
114. WOMEN AND LAW RESEARCH IN SOUTHERN AFRICA PROJECT, MAINTENANCE IN
SWAZILAND (1992).

115. Id. at iii.
116. See Abdullahi Ahmed An-Na'im, Civil Rights in the Islamic Constitutional Tradition: Shared Ideals and Divergent Regimes, 25 J MARSHALL L. REv 267 (1992). A
weakness not apparent on the face of the decision is that all the justices on the Court of
Appeal are expatriates. Despite some criticism from legal practitioners, the government
has not moved expeditiously to appoint Batswana judges.
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Nonetheless, the goal of international human rights norms is to establish
a bottom line below which societies cannot go regardless of their own
11 7
cultural values.
Botswana adopted its own bottom line when it enacted its Constitution
in 1966. As interpreted by Judge President Amissah, Section 3 of the
Botswana Constitution establishes the international norm that prohibits
discrimination based on sex as the law of Botswana. Section 18 insures
that the courts will be open to those who suffer injury because of a
violation of the provisions of the Constitution. The international norm
has thus not been thrust upon the people of Botswana, the people
themselves agreed when they adopted the Constitution to be governed by
the international norm.
The victory won by Unity Dow is not for women only It will also
benefit males. This is illustrated by the Nigerian case, Shugaba
Abduvahaman Darman v Minister of InternationalAffairs."' Darman,
who was the leader in the Borno State House of Assembly, was kidnapped
from his home by his political rivals, transported across the Chad border
and refused entrance back into Nigeria, even though he possessed a
Nigerian passport. The government argued that he was not a Nigerian
citizen because his father had been born in Chad. However, Darman was
able to establish that his mother was born in Nigeria. On that basis, the
courts declared him a citizen of Nigeria and ruled that his deportation
was illegal. They ordered that his passport be returned and that Darman
be awarded damages. Had Unity Dow not prevailed, a person of Darman's
status in Botswana could be deported from Botswana and denied his
passport.
By holding the Citizenship Act of 1984 unconstitutional, the Court of
Appeal of Botswana made a powerful statement supporting sexual equality
and the norms established by the international community It gave
constitutional protection not only to women, but to all persons in Botswana.

117 James Silk, Traditional Culture and Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA.
290 (Abdullahi A. An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng eds.,

CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES

1990). The Umted Nations Human Rights Committee avoided the question whether the
Canadian Indian Act that denied a Native American woman her status as an Indian if
she married a non-Native American man but did not deny Indian status to a Native
American man who married a non-Native American woman constituted illegal sex discrimination under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. Lovelace v. Canada,
Communication No. R. 624, 36 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 40) at 166, U.N. Doc. A/36/
40, reprinted in 2 Hum. Rrs. L.J. 158 (1981). The Committee was able to avoid the

question because the Covenant did not take effect in Canada until after Mrs. Lovelace's
marriage. Nonetheless, the Committee found that Canada violated Article 27 of the
Covenant that guaranteed minorities the right to enjoy their own culture in community
with other members of their group. See Cook, supra note 109, at 784-85; James W Zion,
North American Indian Perspectives on Human Rights, in HuMAN RIGHTS IN CROSSCtrURA. PERSPECTIVES 193-93 (Abdullahi An-Na'im ed. 1992).

118. 2 Nig. Con. L. Rep. 459 (Maiduguri High Ct. 1981), aff'd, 3 Nig. Con. L. Rep.
915 (Kaduna Fed. Ct. App. 1982).
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In doing so, it provided a persuasive precedent for the protection of
human rights for many other African nations as well.
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